Frontier AI models have knowledge that could be misused for nefarious purposes. To address this risk, we introduce Gradient Routed Auxiliary Modules (GRAM), a method for isolating dangerous knowledge to specific modules within a language model. These modules can be switched on or off to control what the model knows, making it possible to restrict or extend access to the most sensitive model capabilities based on user need and trust. In our experiments, we find evidence that a single model trained in this way can approximate multiple models, each trained with a different category of dangerous data filtered out, and this ability holds for models ranging from 50M to 5B parameters. This research is preliminary and has not been applied to production models at Anthropic.
Read the full paper
Code on GitHub
Read the announcement on Anthropic's blog
Download the model weights (coming soon)
Dual-use papers dataset on Hugging Face
Authors: Ethan Roland*, Murat Cubuktepe*, Erick Martinez*, Stijn Servaes, Keenan Pepper, Mike Vaiana, Diogo Schwerz de Lucena, Judd Rosenblatt (AE Studio); Addie Foote (Independent); Cem Anil, Alex Cloud (Anthropic). *Equal contribution.
Published: June 2026
This work was done at AE Studio, in collaboration with Anthropic. Funded by the AI Alignment Foundation
One of the major threats from frontier AI models is the misuse of legitimately helpful knowledge for harmful tasks, such as creating biological weapons or attacking critical infrastructure. AI companies already manage this risk with a mix of defenses: training models to refuse harmful requests, running classifiers to detect and reject dangerous queries, and restricting which users can access which models through vetting and tiered deployment. Each has drawbacks. Refusals and classifiers are behavioral layers on top of knowledge the model still has; they can be jailbroken and must be retuned for every release. Tiered access works at the level of whole models and whole accounts, so it forces a coarse trade-off: either a user gets every capability the model has, or they get a weaker model across the board.
An alternative approach is access control at the level of individual capabilities. For example, a deployment that includes advanced virology knowledge for a vetted biosecurity lab and excludes it everywhere else, with general performance unchanged in both cases. The most direct route to achieve this would be to train separate models on separately filtered datasets, reserving the most capable model variants for high-trust settings. But training multiple frontier models is prohibitively expensive.
To address this need, we develop Gradient-Routed Auxiliary Modules (GRAM), a method that approximates the performance of multiple data filtered models at the cost of a single training run. GRAM builds on prior ideas including DEMix layers, SGTM, and gradient routing. Our contribution is to develop these ideas for better performance and to test them in a larger and more realistic setting than prior work. Readers may also be interested in NULLs, a similar method developed concurrently. We compare against post-hoc unlearning methods (designed to remove concepts from an existing model) and against LoRA, a competitive baseline that fine-tunes a filtered model to add dual-use capabilities back in.
GRAM induces specialization in the modules by being selective about which parts of the model predict and learn from each type of data. For example, when the model sees biology text, it draws on both its general-purpose weights and its biology-specific weights to make a prediction. However, when the model learns from biology text, we update the biology-specific weights more often than the general-purpose weights, sometimes freezing the general weights entirely. By adjusting how often those general-purpose weights are frozen, we can control how well biology is isolated.
Throughout our experiments, we calculate model performance in terms of Compute Ratio, a compute-adjusted version of loss. It measures, for a given model and data domain, how long it took the all-data baseline model to reach the same loss while training, relative to the length of a whole training run. A value of 1.0 matches the baseline and a value of 0.5 indicates the model performs as well as the baseline after finishing 50% of training.
Core trains every step; one auxiliary module attaches at random.
The auxiliary module trains; core trains only intermittently.
Experiment 1
Data filtering (5 models)
GRAM (1 model)
Data filtering
GRAM
Core Data Only
Core Module Only
+ Deadlines Data
+ Deadlines Module
+ Aliens Data
+ Aliens Module
+ Eras Data
+ Eras Module
+ Cultures Data
+ Cultures Module
Experiment 2
reference — 5 models
1 model
1 model
5 models
Experiment 3
Core ↑
Retain ↑
Forget ↓
Elicit ↓
Experiment 4
GRAM
Filter + LoRA
GRAM
Filter + LoRA
Experiment 5
Our work leaves open questions.
We are excited about future research on:
@inproceedings{
roland2026modular,
title={Modular Pretraining Enables Access Control},
author={Ethan Roland and Murat Cubuktepe and Erick Martinez and Stijn Servaes and Keenan Pepper and Michael Vaiana and Diogo S de Lucena and Judd Rosenblatt and Addie Foote and Cem Anil and Alex Cloud},
booktitle={Forty-third International Conference on Machine Learning},
year={2026},
url={https://openreview.net/forum?id=yIubI9l3IT},
eprint={2607.08077},
archivePrefix={arXiv}
}